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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 By 2015, the number of asbestos-injury claims in America is 
projected to exceed 250,000.
1
 Long-term exposure to asbestos, often 
occupationally, has been linked to a number of debilitating diseases.
2
 
Asbestos-related diseases often have prolonged latency periods, which can 
leave afflicted individuals without opportunity to effectively treat these 
painful, and often fatal, ailments.
3
 Although many asbestos-related disease 
victims may seek a legal remedy, a narrow class of these individuals may be 
left without recourse.
4
 
 During the twentieth century, a large number of railroad workers 
were exposed to asbestos-containing products.
5
 Consequently, thousands of 
railroad workers afflicted with asbestos-related diseases have brought claims 
against rail carriers and locomotive equipment manufacturers responsible for 
their exposure to asbestos-containing products.
6
 The ensuing litigation has 
raised legal questions including federal preemption, which ultimately results 
in the preclusion of state law tort claims.
7
   
 State laws have historically provided redress for persons injured by 
defective products, failure to warn, and consumer rights violations.
8
 
However, in its 2012 decision in Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., the 
United States Supreme Court declared that federal legislation in the field of 
locomotives and locomotive equipment preempts state law tort claims.
9
 
Kurns relied on the Court’s decision in Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 
                                                 
1 See infra text accompanying note 44 (referencing a comprehensive study of 
asbestos injury litigation). 
2 See infra text accompanying note 37 (citing diseases such as mesothelioma, 
asbestosis, pleural changes, and lung cancer). 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 38, 41 (explaining that a latency period 
ranging from ten to forty years may result in incurable disease). 
4 See infra text accompanying note 30 (noting that nonemployees must use state 
courts because nonemployees cannot pursue FELA claims); see also infra text accompanying 
note 152 (leaving nonemployees exposed to asbestos-containing products from locomotive 
“parts and appurtenances” without a remedy because state law tort claims are preempted).  
5 See infra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that railroad employees 
worked with or around asbestos-containing products). 
6 See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (railroad 
employee suing multiple defendants for the distribution and manufacture of locomotive brake 
shoes and locomotive engine valves that contained asbestos with which he came into contact); 
In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d 818 (W. Va. 2003) (class-action suit by railroad 
workers against manufacturers of locomotive brakes and engines); Ransford v. Griffin Wheel 
Co., No. A121620, 2009 WL 1994740 (Cal. Ct. App. July 9, 2009) (railroad employee suing 
manufacturer of asbestos-laden brake pads on locomotives and rolling stock). 
7 See, e.g., Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (holding that the LIA preempts state law 
tort claims); Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740, at *1 (holding that the LIA preempts state law tort 
claims). 
8 See infra note 52 and accompanying text (citing that state law usually provides 
redress for tort claims). 
9 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (providing the Court’s holding in Kurns).  
2
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where it held that the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), promulgated in 
1911, “occupies the field” of locomotive equipment and thereby precludes 
state law regulating the same.
10
 However, the concurring and dissenting 
Justices in Kurns stated that it is “doubtful” Napier would be decided the 
same way today because the Court’s recent cases have required that 
Congress do much more to displace state law from an entire field.
11
 
Nevertheless, the Justices felt compelled by stare decisis to agree with the 
majority that the LIA occupies the field of locomotive equipment.
12
  
 Notwithstanding the LIA’s field preemption, a reviewing court 
ultimately determines whether the LIA preempts state law based on the facts 
before it and its interpretation of what the LIA field covers.
13
 While eighty-
five years of stare decisis holds that state laws directed at “locomotive 
equipment” or locomotive “parts and appurtenances” are preempted by the 
LIA, what constitutes a part or appurtenance of a locomotive has only been 
defined in abstract terms and, therefore, remains open for interpretation by 
the courts.
14
 For instance, courts have been called on to decide whether a 
two-way telemetry system is an appurtenance of a locomotive or whether a 
formerly attached pin cushion unit is an appurtenance of the locomotive and 
thereby falls within the LIA’s preemptive scope.
15
  
 This comment addresses whether brake shoes on and in a line of 
railcars are an appurtenance of the locomotive. Despite the Court’s recent 
decision in Kurns, reviewing courts should limit the scope and effect of the 
LIA’s field in light of the doctrinal shift to reluctance on field preemption 
and find that brake shoes on railcars are not a part or appurtenance of a 
locomotive.
16
 That assertion is supported by a presumption against 
                                                 
10 Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926). 
11 See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring) (opining that, “[v]iewed 
through the lens of modern preemption law, Napier is an anachronism,” and citing N.Y. State 
Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973), which rejected field preemption 
despite a “detailed” and “comprehensive regulatory scheme”); Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1271 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997)) (stating that “recent cases have 
frequently rejected field pre-emption in the absence of statutory language expressly requiring 
it”). 
12 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1271 (discussing the Court’s reasoning). 
13 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486–92 (1996) (conducting a 
preemption analysis based on its interpretation of the preempted field). 
14 See Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (stating that the eighty-five year old decision in Napier, which held that state laws 
directed at locomotive equipment were preempted by the LIA, remains the law); S. Ry. Co. v. 
Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402 (1936); see, e.g., infra Part II.E (providing case illustrations of 
courts interpreting the extent of parts or appurtenances). 
15 See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. State of Mont., 805 F. Supp. 1522, 1529 (D. 
Mont. 1992) (holding two-way telemetry system was not a locomotive part or appurtenance); 
Milesco v. Norfolk S. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 214, 221 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that a 
cushion unit was not a locomotive part or appurtenance). 
16 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (holding that “state-law design-defect and failure-to-
warn claims fall within the field of locomotive equipment regulation pre-empted by the LIA, 
3
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preemption, a detailed analysis of the on-point case law, the incongruent 
intent of the LIA, and the unjust consequences—specifically that asbestos-
related disease victims may be left without a remedy—that result from field 
preemption.
17
  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
This section provides a comprehensive overview of the 
considerations a court must take into account when deciding whether the LIA 
preempts state law tort claims against the manufacturer of asbestos-
containing products not located on the locomotive itself. Additionally, this 
section discusses the LIA, asbestos litigation generally, the preemption 
doctrine, the scope of LIA’s preemption, judicial interpretations of the LIA’s 
phrase “locomotive . . . parts or appurtenances,” and judicial interpretations 
of the LIA’s preemptive coverage with regard to brake shoes on railcars.
18
 
 
A. The Locomotive Inspection Act 
 
 In 1911, Congress enacted the Boiler Inspection Act (BIA) in the 
midst of the Progressive Era movement towards regulation of health and 
safety.
19
 The BIA was the result of successful lobbying efforts by a railroad 
employee union.
20
 The union cited the currently ineffective safety procedures 
of small carriers that failed to use due care and the rush of traffic that led to 
shortcuts.
21
 The BIA’s purpose was humanitarian, as it sought to address the 
dangers from boilers, namely boiler explosions, often caused by low water 
levels.
22
 After implementation, the increased inspection of boilers eventually 
                                                                                                                   
as that field was defined in Napier”). “The LIA lacks an express preemption clause and our 
recent cases have frequently rejected field pre-emption in absence of statutory language 
expressly requiring it.” Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 617) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
17 See infra Parts III.E–F (arguing that the preemptive scope of the LIA does not 
include every part or component on a train, specifically the LIA does not reach brake shoes on 
freight cars); infra text accompanying note 30 (noting that nonemployees must use state courts 
because nonemployees cannot pursue FELA claims); infra text accompanying note 152 
(nonemployees exposed to asbestos-containing products from locomotive parts or 
appurtenances are left without a remedy because state law tort claims are preempted). 
18 See infra Parts II.A–F (providing background that a court must take into 
account when considering whether the LIA precludes state law tort claims against 
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products not located on the locomotive itself). 
19 Mark Aldrich, Running Out of Steam: Federal Inspection and Locomotive 
Safety, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 884, 884 (2007) (recounting the historical underpinnings of the LIA). 
The BIA is the predecessor of the LIA. See also Napier, 272 U.S. at 608 (explaining the 
historical context in which the LIA was passed). 
20 Aldrich, supra note 19, at 888 (discussing the motives behind the LIA). 
21 Id. (discussing the union’s interest in promoting the passage of the LIA). 
22 Id. at 885–86 (noting that locomotives were a source of risk for a “significant 
fraction of the labor force”); see also Garcia v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 714–15 
(10th Cir. 1987) (“The BIA was enacted in 1911, when railroads used steam locomotives. The 
4
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led to reporting defects unrelated to the boilers, such as leaky steam valves 
on the locomotive.
23
 Congress amended the BIA four years later, providing 
coverage to “the entire locomotive and tender and all parts and 
appurtenances thereof.”
24
 Thereafter, the BIA became known as the 
Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA).
25
 Currently, the LIA states: 
 
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive 
or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or 
tender and its parts and appurtenances— 
(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without 
unnecessary danger of personal injury;  
(2) have been inspected as required under this chapter and 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation 
under this chapter; and  
(3) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary 
under this chapter.
26
  
 
 The LIA establishes that rail carriers owe an absolute duty to safely 
maintain its locomotives and their parts and appurtenances.
27
 The Supreme 
Court has also recognized the LIA’s primary purpose is to “protect[] . . . 
railroad employees and perhaps also . . . passengers and the public at large 
. . . from injury due to industrial accident.”
28
 However, the LIA does not 
confer a right of action for an injured employee.
29
 Instead, a LIA violation 
establishes negligence per se under the Federal Employee Liability Act 
                                                                                                                   
boilers in steam locomotives could explode violently and cause serious damages to persons 
and property.”). 
23 Aldrich, supra note 19, at 890–91 (discussing the expansion of the LIA).  
24 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing the Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 169, § 1, 38 Stat. 
1192). Near the time of the amendment, a locomotive was commonly known as the propelling 
engine at the front of the train. See WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1913) 
(defining a locomotive as an “engine; self-propelling wheel carriage, especially one which 
bears a steam boiler and one or more steam engines which communicate motion to the wheels 
and thus propel the carriage, [] used to convey goods or passengers, or draw wagons, railroad 
cars . . . ”) 
25 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1265. “The BIA as amended became commonly known as 
the Locomotive Inspection Act.” Id. 
26 49 U.S.C. § 20701 (2012) (noting the Supreme Court also stated that “[a] 
‘tender’ is a ‘[a] car attached to a locomotive, for carrying a supply of fuel and water.’” Kurns, 
132 S. Ct. at 1272 n.1 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 2126 (1917))). 
27 Lunsford, 297 U.S. at 401 (stating that the LIA imposes an “absolute and 
continuing duty to maintain the locomotive and all their parts and appurtenances thereof, in 
proper condition and safe to operate in active service without unnecessary peril to life or 
limb”). 
28 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 191 (1949).  
29 Elston v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 74 P.3d 478, 483 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) 
(discussing the purpose of the LIA and the consequences for violations). 
5
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(FELA), which provides a cause of action for injured railroad employees 
only.
30
 
 While FELA provides a remedy for railroad employees injured on 
the job due to a railroad carrier’s negligence, it does not expressly provide a 
remedy for nonemployees.
31
 Courts have established that nonemployee 
claims must be addressed by state law tort claims.
32
 However, if state law 
tort claims alleged by nonemployees arising out of LIA violations are 
preempted, those injured nonemployees are left without a remedy.
33
 
 
B. Asbestos Litigation 
 
 Asbestos was widely used during the twentieth century.
34
 Asbestos’s 
resistance to heat, fire, and corrosion, and its versatility and availability led 
to its widespread use in numerous industries.
35
 Consequently, tens of 
millions of Americans have been exposed to asbestos in their occupations.
36
 
Asbestos exposure has been linked to a number of debilitating diseases, such 
as mesothelioma, asbestosis, pleural changes, lung cancer, and other various 
cancers.
37
 Asbestos-related diseases have a long latency period, lasting 
anywhere from ten to forty years.
38
 This latency period explains medicine’s 
lag in understanding and contribution to the unrestricted use of asbestos-
                                                 
30 Id. at 483–84 (noting that while the LIA does not confer a right of action on an 
injured employee, “a railroad employee who is injured as a result of an LIA violation may sue 
under FELA alleging an LIA claim”).  
31 See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012) (providing no express remedy for nonemployees); 
“[I]t has been held consistently that the Boiler Inspection Act supplements the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act by imposing on interstate railroads ‘an absolute and continuing duty’ 
to provide safe equipment.” Urie, 337 U.S. at 188. 
32 See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 51. “[T]he nonemployee must look for his remedy to a 
common law action in tort, which is to say that he must sue in a state court, in the absence of 
diversity, to implement a state cause of action.” Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. Co., 395 
U.S. 164, 166 (1969). 
33 See, e.g., Beimert v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 62-CV-12-9393, at *7 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013) (recognizing the unjust consequences that may result from preemption 
in this context). 
34 Overview of Asbestos Claims and Trends, AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES’ MASS 
TORTS SUBCOMM. 1 (Aug. 2007), http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbestos_aug07.pdf 
[hereinafter Overview of Asbestos]. 
35 Id. (noting that asbestos was used in “building materials such as cement siding, 
insulation, roofing, flooring, and wire insulation; brake and boiler linings; gaskets; and ship 
building materials—especially during World War II”); see also 60 AM. JUR. TRIALS 73 § 14 
[hereinafter AM. JUR. TRIALS] (listing “[r]ailroad workers (including locomotive mechanics, 
car mechanics and rebuilders, and maintenance personnel)” as a known occupation in which 
workers worked with or around asbestos-containing products). 
36 Overview of Asbestos, supra note 34, at 1 (providing a general discussion on 
asbestos and asbestos disease). 
37 Id. at 2 (providing a general discussion on asbestos and asbestos disease). 
38 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 35, § 26 (discussing the long-term course of 
asbestos-related diseases). 
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containing products during the twentieth century.
39
 Due in part to the 
prolonged latency period, curative treatment is often unavailable at the time 
of diagnosis.
40
 Thus, certain afflicted individuals face an unstoppable, slow 
and painful death.
41
  
 The asbestos-related litigation that ensued has had a profound effect 
on America’s civil justice system.
42
 A 2005 comprehensive study concluded 
that at least 730,000 asbestos claimants filed lawsuits through 2002.
43
 
Another study predicted that by the year 2015 there will be as many as 
265,000 pending asbestos-injury cases.
44
 Frequently, manufacturers of 
asbestos-containing products are named as defendants.
45
 In asbestos cases, 
defendants faced with state law tort claims often argue that the LIA preempts 
the plaintiff’s claims.
46
 
 
C. Preemption 
 
 Preemption is a judicial response to a conflict that arises out of the 
United States Constitution’s formulation of dual sovereignty.
47
 Dual 
sovereignty creates discrete powers in the federal government and reserves 
all other powers to the states.
48
 To resolve this conflict, courts have relied on 
the Supremacy Clause, which states that federal law “shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
contrary notwithstanding.”
49
 Thus, Congress, through its enumerated powers, 
                                                 
39 Overview of Asbestos, supra note 34, §§ 1, 13 (noting the widespread use of 
asbestos until 1973 when the government began to regulate and ultimately ban the use of 
asbestos). 
40 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 35, § 1 (explaining the late onset of 
symptomology of asbestos-related diseases). 
41 See Roberts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 878 So. 2d 631, 644 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004) (exploring a doctor’s testimony that the mesothelioma afflicted patient suffered 
“incredible pain caused by mesothelioma and stated that, ‘[e]very breath becomes painful’”). 
42 Overview of Asbestos, supra note 34, at 3 (discussing asbestos-related 
litigation). 
43 Id. (citing a 2005 RAND report regarding asbestos related litigation). 
44 See AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 35, § 4 (citing Stephen Labaton, Judge’s 
Panel, Seeing Court Crisis, Combines 26,000 Asbestos Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/30/business/judges-panel-seeing-court-
crisis-combines-26000-asbestos-cases.html). 
45 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 35 (discussing asbestos related litigation). 
46 See, e.g., Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1265 (raising preemption defense on behalf of 
defendant manufacturer of asbestos product); In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d at 821 
(raising preemption defense on behalf of defendant manufacturer of asbestos product facing 
class action lawsuit). 
47 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 509 
(Carolina Acad. Press, 3d ed. 2011). 
48 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–28 (1997) (discussing dual 
sovereignty and preemption in general).  
49 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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may enact federal legislation that forces states to yield in areas it otherwise 
may control.
50
  
 While “[p]reemption is fundamentally an inquiry into congressional 
intent,” courts have established a bias against preemption.
51
 Preemption 
inquiries are guided by a general presumption that the state’s historic police 
powers were not intended to be superseded by federal law absent a clear and 
manifest purpose from Congress to do so.
52
 Consequently, the presumption 
against preemption promotes a narrow interpretation of federal law.
53
 
 It is well established that state law is preempted by federal statute 
either expressly or by implication.
54
 Express preemption occurs when 
Congress explicitly defines the extent that the enactment displaces state 
law.
55
 Explicit preemption of state law makes preemption interpretation a 
less daunting task because “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ‘ultimate 
touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis.”
56
 
 A more difficult task for a court arises while considering preemption 
in absence of explicit displacement of state law, otherwise known as implied 
                                                 
50 CURTIS, supra note 47, at 509 (noting that “Congress may use its Commerce 
Clause powers (or other powers) to prevent states from regulating activities that the states 
would otherwise be free to reach”). 
51 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990); Medtronic, Inc., 518 
U.S. at 485 (stating that courts have “long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-
empt state-law causes of action”) ; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting “[t]he presumption against preemption is heightened 
where federal law is said to bar state actions in fields of traditional state regulation”). 
52 Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485; see also FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 498 U.S. 52, 
53 (1990) (noting that there exists a “presumption that Congress does not intend to pre-empt 
areas of traditional state regulation”); CURTIS, supra note 47, at 535 (stating “state laws 
typically provide redress . . . for those by injured defective products, injured by failure to 
warn, injured by fraud, or injured by consumers’ rights violations”).  
53 Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485 (endorsing a narrow interpretation of federal 
law to avoid preemption). 
54 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(discussing various ways in which courts find preemption).  
55 English, 496 U.S. at 78 (exploring preemption generally); see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a) (2012) (stating that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
expressly preempts state law “insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan . . . ”); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316 (noting that the Medical Device Amendments 
(MDA) of 1976 contains an express preemption clause). For example, the MDA states: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political 
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a 
device intended for human use any requirement—(1) which is different 
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to 
the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the 
device under this chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012).  
56 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Retail 
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
8
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preemption.
57
 Implied preemption occurs in two ways: (1) implied conflict 
preemption and (2) implied field preemption.
58
 In the first instance, implied 
conflict preemption occurs where the coexistence of state and federal law is a 
“physical impossibility” or where “state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”
59
 
 Second, implied field preemption occurs by declaration of a court if 
Congress intended the Federal Government to “occupy a field” of activity 
exclusively.
60
 The Supreme Court has aptly stated the basis for field 
preemption: 
 
Such an intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal 
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, or 
where an Act of Congress touch[es] a field in which the 
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.
61
  
 
With that bias in mind, a reviewing court ultimately “defines the scope of . . . 
field preemption” when faced with a preemption inquiry.
62
 
 Historically, field preemption was implied on a basis of mere 
delegation of authority, without reference to Congress’s intent to displace 
state law.
63
 However, the Court’s modern approach to field preemption has 
required Congress to “do much more to oust all of state law from a field.”
64
  
 
                                                 
57 CURTIS, supra note 47, at 535 (stating that preemption decisions can be 
problematic because Congress could have resolved such issues by drafting a more precise 
statute). 
58 CURTIS, supra note 47, at 537 (noting the various types of implied preemption). 
59 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
60 English, 496 U.S. at 79 (discussing implied preemption). 
61 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)).  
62 Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting 
“[t]he scope of preemption under the Boiler Inspection Act is determined by the interpretation 
of the words ‘parts and appurtenances.’”); see also Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 486 
(discussing the different methods in which a reviewing court determines the scope of a 
statute’s preemption). It is also worth mentioning that, according to the West Virginia 
Supreme Court, state courts “have the authority to decide whether a state provision is indeed 
preempted by federal law.” In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d at 821. The West Virginia 
Supreme Court held their “state courts have the subject matter jurisdiction over federal 
preemption defenses.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Orlofske v. City of Wheeling, 575 S.E.2d 532, 
538 (W. Va. 2002)).  
63 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(discussing the preemption doctrine’s history). 
64 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 617 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(explaining the Court’s modern approach to preemption). 
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D. The LIA’s Preemptive Effect 
 
 The notion that the LIA occupies the field of locomotive equipment 
has snowballed through stare decisis.
65
 In Napier, the Supreme Court 
considered the preemptive scope and effect of the LIA.
66
 The Court declared 
that the LIA “occupies the field” and extends to the “design, construction and 
the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and of all 
appurtenances.”
67
 In that consolidated case, the Court considered a Georgia 
statute that required locomotives to have an automatic fire door and a 
Wisconsin statute that required locomotives to have a cab curtain.
68
 The 
Court grounded its decision on the broad scope of authority that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) possessed to carry out the LIA, describing the 
ICC’s authority as a “general one.”
69
 The Court found it dispositive that the 
state statutes were directed at the “equipment of locomotives,” which 
consequently conflicted with the BIA.
70
 In sum, the Court “defined the 
preempted field as the physical composition of the locomotive equipment.”
71
  
 More recently, in In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals considered the scope of LIA preemption in the 
context of mass litigation involving several thousand railroad employees 
alleging injuries from exposure to asbestos-containing products.
72
 The court 
addressed whether the LIA preempted state law tort claims against 
manufacturers of parts or components of locomotives.
73
 The court relied on a 
Ninth Circuit case in order to declare a broad preemptive sweep across train 
parts and components.
74
 The court recognized the presumption against 
preemption, but ultimately felt compelled to follow “an avalanche of adverse 
authority from other jurisdictions” and held that the LIA preempted state law 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Napier, 272 U.S. 605 at 612 (providing the Supreme Court’s first 
decision that the LIA preempts state law); Kurns, 132 S. Ct. 1261 (relying on the decision in 
Napier nearly eighty-five years later). 
66 Napier, 272 U.S. at 607 (discussing whether the BIA preempted state statutes 
in Georgia and Wisconsin). 
67 Id. at 611. 
68 Id. at 607.  
69 Id. at 611. 
70 Id. at 612–13.  
71 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1272 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(analyzing the Napier decision). 
72 See In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d 818. 
73 Id. at 820.  
74 Id. at 823–24 (citing Law v. Gen. Motors Corp. 114 F.3d 908, 910 (9th Cir. 
1997) (“This broad preemptive sweep is necessary to maintain uniformity of railroad 
operating standards across state lines. Locomotives are designed to travel long distances, with 
most railroad routes wending through interstate commerce.”)). It should also be noted that the 
court in Law addressed whether the manufacturers of “locomotive brakes and engines” were 
liable, as opposed to manufacturers of “train parts and components.” Law, 114 F.3d at 910. 
However, the court in In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig. did not make the distinction between 
“locomotive brakes and engines” and “train parts and components.” In re W. Va. Asbestos 
Litig., 592 S.E.2d at 823–24. 
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tort claims against railroads and manufacturers of “various products used by 
the railroads.”
75
  
 In In re W. Va. Litig., the court noted the plaintiff’s argument that 
innocent plaintiffs should not be left without a remedy.
76
 The court 
recognized the merit of the argument, noting that “for every wrong there is a 
remedy.”
77
 However, the court stated that the defendant’s arguments led the 
court to believe there were no such instances in the case before it.
78
 
In 2012, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kurns addressed the same 
issue as in In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig.—whether the LIA preempts state law 
tort claims for design defect and failure to warn.
79
 The plaintiff, George 
Corson, installed brake shoes on locomotives and stripped insulation from 
locomotive boilers by occupation in locomotive repair and maintenance 
facilities.
80
 After a thirty-plus year latency, Corson was diagnosed with 
malignant mesothelioma.
81
 Thereafter, Corson filed state law tort claims 
against multiple defendants for the distribution and manufacture of 
locomotive brake shoes and locomotive engine valves containing asbestos 
that caused his injuries.
82
  
 The manufacturers and distributors of the asbestos-containing 
products moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state law tort claims 
were preempted by the LIA.
83
 Corson argued: (1) that the LIA did not cover 
repair and maintenance of locomotives;
 
(2) that failure to warn claims were 
not preempted because “the basis of liability for failure to warn . . . is not the 
‘design’ or ‘manufacture’ of a product, but instead the failure to provide 
adequate warnings regarding the product’s risks;” (3) that the state law tort 
claims fell outside the LIA because the “manufacturers were not regulated 
under the LIA at the time the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to asbestos;” 
and (4) that the LIA “does not extend to state common law claims, as 
opposed to state legislation or regulation.”
84
 The Court rejected all of 
Corson’s arguments.
85
 Relying exclusively on Napier, the Court reiterated 
                                                 
75 In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d at 820, 822 (noting the overwhelming 
presence of authority in other jurisdictions holding that the LIA preempted state law tort 
claims). 
76 Id. at 822 n.2. 
77 Id. (quoting Sanders v. Meredith, 89 S.E. 733, 736 (W. Va. 1916)). 
78 Id. (stating that the defendant’s arguments persuaded the court that no innocent 
plaintiffs existed, among thousands). 
79 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270 (discussing for the first time at the Supreme Court 
whether the LIA preempted state law tort claims). 
80 Id. at 1264. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 1262, 1264 (noting the plaintiff’s claims of defective design and 
failure to warn of the dangers posed by asbestos). 
83 Id. at 1265. 
84 Id. at 1265–69 (providing plaintiff’s arguments regarding the LIA’s preemption 
of his claims). 
85 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1268–69 (discussing the Napier decision and its continued 
vitality). 
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that field preemption focused on the “physical elements regulated—the 
equipment of locomotives”—and that the LIA “occup[ied] the entire field of 
regulating locomotive equipment.”
86
 The Court conclusively stated, without 
inquiry into whether the defective products were locomotive parts or 
appurtenances, that the claims of defective locomotive brake shoes and 
insulation on locomotive boilers were the equipment of locomotives.
87
 Thus, 
the distinctions suggested by Corson were unpersuasive because they all 
related to the equipment of locomotives and “Napier dictate[d] that they 
[fell] within the preempted field [of the LIA].”
88
 In sum, the Supreme Court 
held that the LIA preempted state law tort claims.
89
 
 Justice Kagan’s concurring and Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting 
opinions agreed with the majority that Corson’s defective design claims were 
preempted, despite their disapproval of Napier’s declaration of the LIA’s 
field preemption.
90
 In her concurrence, Justice Kagan wrote, “[l]ike Justice 
Sotomayor, I doubt this Court would decide Napier . . . in the same way 
today.”
91
 Justice Kagan criticized Napier for declaring field preemption 
“based on nothing more than a statute granting regulatory authority over that 
subject matter to a federal agency.”
92
 Justice Sotomayor noted that “[t]he 
LIA lacks an express pre-emption clause, and our recent cases have 
frequently rejected field pre-emption in the absence of statutory language 
expressly requiring it.”
93
 Justice Sotomayor’s reluctant adherence to Napier’s 
declaration of field preemption was premised on eighty-five years of stare 
decisis.
94
 
 
E. Judicial Interpretation of Locomotive “Parts and Appurtenances” 
 
 For the better part of the twentieth century, courts have endeavored 
to interpret the phrase “part and appurtenance” contained within the LIA.
95
 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1269. 
88 Id. at 1268. 
89 Id. at 1270. 
90 Id. at 1270–71 (Kagan, J., concurring); see also id. at 1271–75 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
91 Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1271 (Kagan, J., concurring) (opining that, “[v]iewed 
through the lens of modern preemption law, Napier is an anachronism[,]” and citing Dublino, 
413 U.S. at 415, which rejected field preemption despite a detailed and “comprehensive 
statutory scheme”).  
92 Id. at 1271 (Kagan. J., concurring). 
93 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Justice 
Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 617). 
94 See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
95 See, e.g., Lunsford, 297 U.S. at 399–402 (deciding whether an experimental 
emergency braking device was a locomotive part or appurtenance); Grogg v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1012 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (discussing the limits of locomotive parts or 
appurtenances); Garcia, 818 F.2d at 714–15 (deciding whether a two-way telemetry device 
was a locomotive part of appurtenance). 
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The interpretation of locomotive parts and appurtenances is crucial because it 
determines the scope of the LIA.
96
 Consequently, preemption limits a 
plaintiff’s available recourse to FELA claims.
97
 Because the LIA only 
preempts state law if the state law regulates “locomotives and tender and all 
parts and appurtenances thereof,” the interpretation thereby expands or 
contracts the preemptive scope and effect of the LIA.
98
 
 In 1936, the Supreme Court construed the phrase “part and 
appurtenance.”
99
 The discussion arose in the context of whether an 
experimental device fastened beneath the locomotive frame intended to help 
apply the brakes in the event of a derailment was a part or appurtenance of 
the locomotive.
100
 The Court held that the device was not a locomotive part 
or appurtenance thereof.
101
 The Court reasoned that it excluded the device 
from the LIA because inclusion “of every gadget placed upon a locomotive 
by a carrier [would] . . . hinder commendable efforts to better conditions and 
tend to defeat the [LIA’s] evident purpose—avoidance of unnecessary peril 
to life or limb.”
102
 The Court found it convincing that the device did not 
increase the peril to life or limb; rather, it could only prove helpful in the 
event of an emergency.
103
 In its discussion, the Court abstractly defined a 
part and appurtenance as “[w]hatever in fact is an integral or essential part of 
a completed locomotive.”
104
 
 In Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. State, the United States District Court 
for the District of Montana considered what constituted a part or 
appurtenance under the LIA.
105
 In 1991, Montana passed a bill that required 
a two-way telemetry system capable of initiating an emergency brake 
application on certain trains.
106
 A railroad company challenged the bill, 
arguing that the LIA preempted all state regulation beyond what the LIA 
expressly authorized.
107
 The court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the phrase “all parts and appurtenances,” which the court defined as “any 
part or attachment of a locomotive that is within the scope of authority 
                                                 
96 Marshall, 720 F.2d at 1152 (noting “[t]he scope of preemption under the Boiler 
Inspection Act is determined by the interpretation of the words ‘parts and appurtenances.’”). 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 29–32 (explaining that courts have 
established that nonemployee claims must be addressed with state laws). 
98 Napier, 272 U.S. at 608; Marshall, 720 F.2d at 1152 (noting that the scope of 
preemption is determined by the reviewing court’s interpretation of the LIA’s locomotive 
parts and appurtenances). 
99 Lunsford, 297 U.S. at 399–402. 
100 Id. at 399–400. 
101 Id. at 402. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. (stating “mere experimental devices which do not increase the peril, but 
may prove helpful in an emergency, are not [within the statute]”). 
104 Lunsford, 297 U.S. at 402. 
105 Burlington N. R.R. Co., 805 F. Supp. at 1529. 
106 Id. at 1526. 
107 Id. at 1527. 
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delegated to the [Secretary] to prescribe the same part or attachment.”
108
 The 
court held that the Secretary of Transportation had the authority to prescribe 
a telemetry system based on the location of the system’s parts.
109
 
Specifically, the two-way system required a telemetry device in the cab of 
the locomotive.
110
 Thus, the LIA preempted the state’s bill because a portion 
of the device was located on the locomotive.
111
 
 In Milesco v. Norfolk S. Corp., the United States District Court in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania considered whether a gas return cushion unit 
was a locomotive part or appurtenance.
112
 The cushion unit in question was 
removed from a railcar to be scrapped, but expelled gas on a worker and 
exploded while decommissioned.
113
 The court concluded the cushion unit 
was not a locomotive part or appurtenance and denied the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.
114
 While the court found that the cushion unit 
was at one time a part or appurtenance, it refused to find that a discarded 
cushion unit whose only purpose was scrap should be considered an 
appurtenance.
115
 Thus, the injured employee’s state law negligence claims 
were not preempted by the LIA.
116
 
 In Grogg v. CSX Transp., Inc., the United States District Court for 
the District of Indiana discussed the LIA’s “part and appurtenance” phrase.
117
 
In Grogg, a former railroad employee brought a FELA claim against a 
railroad, alleging injuries caused by his repetitive task of riding on defective 
locomotive and defective tracks.
118
 The plaintiff made a general allegation 
against the railroad—that the “defective locomotive design and defective 
                                                 
108 Id. at 1529 (citing Marshall, 720 F.2d at 1152 (relying on the scope of 
authority delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission)). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Burlington N. R.R. Co., 805 F. Supp. at 1529. 
112 Milesco, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 217–18 (considering the “parts and appurtenances” 
phrase of the LIA to determine whether the LIA preempted the plaintiff’s state common law 
claims). 
113 Id. at 221. 
114 Id. at 223. 
115 Id. at 221, 223 (noting the court stated in dicta that the LIA “would clearly 
preempt state law claims challenging the design and construction of the railcar to which the 
unit was attached, as well as the selection and installation of the cushion unit,” but finding that 
the plaintiff’s claims did not arise from “the design or construction of railcars”). The court 
based the commentary on Kurns, stating that Kurns was distinguishable because the plaintiff’s 
common law claims were directed at a decommissioned cushion unit and did “not implicate 
the design, materials, construction or installation of a cushion unit . . . ”. 
116 Id. at 223 (stating that “we do not find Plaintiff’s claims to be preempted by the 
BIA”). 
117 Grogg, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1006–12 (noting that, in Grogg, the defendant 
argued that the LIA precluded the plaintiff’s FELA claim). The discussion regarding 
locomotive parts or appurtenances arose because the court had to decide whether the 
locomotive “design and equipment” fell within the LIA before deciding whether the LIA 
precluded the FELA claim. Id. The court ultimately found the LIA violation did not preclude 
the FELA claim and that the LIA supplemented FELA claims. Id. 
118 Id. at 1008. 
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locomotive seating caused or contributed to his back injury.”
119
 The former 
employee also sued the railroad for his work on a large, oversized ballast that 
failed to meet the railroad’s size specifications.
120
 In its discussion of the 
LIA’s preemptive effect, the court cited Lunsford for the proposition that 
“parts or appurtenances do not include every item of equipment that 
conceivably could be installed on a locomotive.”
121
 Therefore, the court 
concluded that the language defining the preemptive scope of the LIA is not 
“anything and everything that could possibly touch the train or anything and 
everything involving train safety.”
122
 Based on the foregoing, the court held 
that the LIA did not preclude the FELA claim.
123
 
 
F. Brake Shoes on Railcars 
 
 Courts across the country consistently cite to the preceding case law 
when considering whether railcars, specifically brake shoes on railcars, fall 
within the preemptive scope of the LIA.
124
 However, courts have reached 
different results under inconsistent lines of reasoning.
125
 Some courts 
recognize, while others do not, a distinction between the parts and 
appurtenances of the locomotive and the parts and appurtenances of railcars; 
the latter resulting in an expansion of the LIA’s preemptive effect.
126
  
 Several cases have held that brake shoes on freight cars are a 
locomotive part or appurtenance.
127
 In the case of Ransford v. Griffin Wheel 
Co., the plaintiff, Ransford, brought a lawsuit against a manufacturer of 
asbestos-laden brake pads on locomotives and rolling stock.
128
 Ransford 
alleged that he contracted mesothelioma during his fifteen-year exposure to 
asbestos while replacing brake pads.
129
 The California Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment order in favor of the defendants, 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1000. 
121 Id. at 1012. 
122 Id. at 1013. 
123 Grogg, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. 
124 See infra Part II.E (providing case illustrations of frequently cited cases).  
125 See infra Part II.D (illustrating the inconsistencies in reasoning among courts 
deciding whether train or railcar parts are locomotive parts or appurtenances and therefore 
within the scope of the LIA). 
126 Compare Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740 (finding no distinction between parts 
and appurtenances of the locomotive and the parts and appurtenances of railcars), with 
Beimert, No. 62-CV-12-9393 (finding a distinction between parts and appurtenances of the 
locomotive and the parts and appurtenances of railcars). 
127 See, e.g., Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740; In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 
S.E.2d 818. 
128 Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740, at *1. “Rolling stock” generally means freight 
cars or locomotives. See 49 C.F.R. § 224.5 (2013) (“Freight rolling stock means: (1) Any 
locomotive subject to Part 229 of this chapter used to haul or switch freight cars (whether in 
revenue or work train service); and (2) Any railroad freight car (whether used in revenue or 
work train service).”).  
129 Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740, at *1. 
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holding that the plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by the LIA and 
the Safety Appliances Act (SAA).
130
 The court noted that the California 
Supreme Court held that “brakes on railroad cars clearly qualify under the 
BIA as an ‘appurtenant’ to those cars.”
131
 To support its decision, the court 
relied on a California Supreme Court decision holding that the BIA 
precluded state common law suits by a former railroad worker against a 
locomotive manufacturer.
132
 Further, the court discussed a California 
Appellate Court case, Frastaci v. Vapor Corp., which held that a railroad 
repairman’s state common law tort claims against a locomotive manufacturer 
were preempted by the LIA.
133
 In Frastaci, the railroad repairman alleged 
exposure to asbestos in locomotives during repair and maintenance.
134
 In 
sum, the court held that brake shoes on railcars were clearly an appurtenance 
to the railcars.
135
 Thus, the claims directed at railcars fell within the scope of 
the LIA and thereby preempted.
136
  
 In In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals held that state tort law claims against manufacturers of train parts or 
components of railroad locomotives are preempted by the LIA.
137
 The court 
relied primarily on a Ninth Circuit case, Law v. Gen. Motors Corp., and its 
progeny in its decision to preempt state law tort claims.
138
 However, in Law 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
132 Id. at *2 (discussing Scheiding v. Gen. Motors Corp., 993 P.2d 996, 997 (Cal. 
2000)). 
133 Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740, at *2 (discussing Frastaci v. Vapor Corp., 70 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).  
134 Frastaci, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404. 
135 Ransford, 2009 WL 1994740, at *2. 
136 Id. It should also be noted that the California Appellate Court invoked the SAA 
to conclude that brake shoes on railcars were preempted because the brake shoes on railcars 
were deemed safety equipment. Id. 
137 In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d at 824 (placing emphasis on train parts 
or components, as opposed to locomotive parts or appurtenances). 
138 Id. at 822–23 (examining Law, 114 F.3d 908). As the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia stated: 
Since the decision in Law v. General Motors Corp., many other 
jurisdictions have adopted a similar view . . . . We note the following 
authority is in accord: Scheiding v. General Motors Corp., 993 P.2d 996 
(Cal. 2000) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts employees’ product-liability 
actions against a manufacturer of locomotives containing asbestos 
materials); Seaman v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct. 
2000) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts claims made by employees against 
manufacturers of train components containing asbestos); Key v. Norfolk 
Southern Ry. Co., 491 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Boiler Inspection 
Act preempts common law claims against railroad by employee injured in 
fall from locomotive steps); Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 130 
F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 1997) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts state-law 
negligence claims for inadequate warning devices on locomotive in action 
brought by motorist struck by train); First Security Bank v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 152 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1998); Oglesby v. Delaware & Hudson Ry., 
180 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 1999) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts employee 
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v. Gen. Motors Corp., the court considered claims by railroad workers 
against manufacturers of locomotive brakes and engines, and not train parts 
or components.
139
 Consequently, the West Virginia Supreme Court equated 
locomotive brakes and engines with train parts and components.
140
 
 In Cunitz-Robinson, the plaintiff, as executrix of her late husband’s 
estate, alleged her husband contracted lung cancer due to long-term asbestos 
exposure specifically related to brake products and other products appended 
to tank cars designed and manufactured by the defendants.
141
 The defendants 
moved for summary judgment, citing the LIA and the decision in Kurns as a 
basis for preemption, and the court considered whether the LIA and Kurns 
preempted state tort claims on brake shoes on tank cars.
142
 Despite the 
plaintiff’s arguments that brake shoes on tank cars were not parts or 
appurtenances of a locomotive, unlike the locomotive brake shoes and 
locomotive engine valves in Kurns, the court held that the brake shoes 
“cannot reasonably be considered anything but locomotive equipment, or in 
other words, locomotives and parts and appurtenances thereof.”
143
 Further, 
the court held that the plaintiff failed to provide any factual basis that the 
“products were not involved with the locomotive at all.”
144
 The court likened 
the plaintiff’s claims with those in Kurns, stating that the claims were 
directed at the “equipment of locomotives.”
145
 
 Recently, a Minnesota trial court recognized a distinction between 
brake shoes on a locomotive and brake shoes on a railcar in its decision on 
                                                                                                                   
common law claims against locomotive seat manufacturer); Forrester v. 
American Dieselelectric, Inc., 255 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (Boiler 
Inspection Act preempts non-employee product-liability actions against a 
manufacturer of locomotive cranes); In re: Amtrak “Sunset Limited” 
Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Alabama, on September 22, 1993, 188 F. 
Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts 
passenger and employee common-law negligence and design-defect 
claims against Amtrak); Roth v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 179 F. Supp. 2d 
1054 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts state common-law 
tort claims against manufacturer of locomotive cab in action brought by 
widow of employee crushed in collision); Bell v. Illinois Central R.R., 236 
F. Supp. 2d 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Boiler Inspection Act preempts 
passengers’ state law claims against locomotive manufacturer); but c.f., 
Engvall v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 632 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 2001) (Boiler 
Inspection Act does not preempt state common law actions based upon a 
violation of the Act, thus a railroad may bring a state law contribution 
claim against a manufacturer of a railroad locomotive).  
Id. at 823–24. 
139 Law, 114 F.3d at 908–11. 
140 In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d at 823–24. 
141 Cunitz-Robinson v. GATX, No. 0954, at *2 (C.P. Phila. Cnty. Apr. 25, 2013). 
142 Id. (emphasis on brake shoes on tank cars as opposed to brake shoes on 
locomotives). 
143 Id. at *6. 
144 Id. The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the asbestos dust that 
caused her husband’s disease was not a part or appurtenance but did not elaborate. Id. at *7. 
145 Id. at *6. 
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summary judgment.
146
 In that case, a railroad employee’s sibling brought 
state law tort claims against the manufacturers of railcar brake shoes, 
alleging that continuous exposure to asbestos while washing her relative’s 
clothes over a number of years caused her mesothelioma.
147
 Faced with 
arguments proposing and opposing summary judgment based on federal 
preemption by the LIA and Kurns, the court concluded the claims were not 
preempted.
148
 The court had four bases for its reasoning. First, the court 
noted the strong presumption against preemption.
149
 Second, the court 
discussed the objective of the LIA, holding that it did not reach the situation 
before the court.
150 
Third, the court distinguished Kurns based on the facts, 
and held that the brake system in locomotives was independent of the 
locomotive itself.
151
 Finally, the court noted the grave consequences of 
summary judgment—that if the LIA preempted the plaintiff’s state law tort 
claim, the plaintiff had no remedy because FELA provides the exclusive 
remedy for LIA violations and nonemployees cannot assert FELA claims.
152
  
                                                 
146 Beimert, No. 62-CV-1293-92, at *5–10 (emphasis added).  
147 Id. at *3 (describing that the plaintiff’s relative changed asbestos-laden brake 
shoes on railcars throughout his career). 
148 Id. at *5 (holding that the LIA did not preempt the plaintiff’s state law tort 
claims under the facts of that case). 
149 Id. at *6 (citing the Supreme Court in Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo 
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981), for the proposition that “[p]re-emption of state 
law by federal statute or regulation is not favored in the absence of persuasive reasons—either 
that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the 
Congress has unmistakably so ordained”). 
150 Id. at *7–8 (explaining that the BIA initially sought to prevent boiler 
explosions on steam locomotives that caused serious damage to persons or property). The 
court further noted that objective of the successor to the BIA, the LIA, “was to allow safe 
operation of locomotives.” Id. (emphasizing the LIA’s concentration on locomotives as 
opposed to the entire train). 
151 Id. at *6–7. The court found that brake shoes in the instant case were 
distinguishable from Kurns based on their location on the railcar, not the locomotive. Id. at *6. 
Further, the court found reliance on case law, such as Ransford and Cunitz-Robinson, 
inapposite. Id. at *8–9. The court also noted that statutory interpretation principles were 
relevant because the LIA was ambiguous with regard to its coverage. Id. at *8. Regarding 
independent brake lines, the court cited a Massachusetts Superior Court case of Middlesex 
County, Manser v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., which wrote:  
. . . railroad car brakes on the cars in this case were part of an integrated 
air brake system designed for the safe operation of the entire train, not just 
the locomotive. Although the brake controls for a multi-vehicle train are 
on the locomotive, the brake system is an integrated train system, not an 
integrated locomotive system. The car brakes are appurtenant to a train 
brake system, but they are not an appurtenant to a locomotive. For this 
reason, state law tort liability is not preempted by the Locomotive Boiler 
Inspection Act.  
Id. at *10 (quoting Manser, No. CA11-4609 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2012)). 
152 Beimert, No. 62-CV-1293-92, at *8. In Beimert, the court considered the 
consequences of the alternative interpretations of the LIA. Id. Considering the consequences 
of alternative interpretations to discern congressional intent is well-founded in case law. See, 
e.g., State v. Hayes, 681 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Wis. 2004) (noting “[a]dditional sources of 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
This comment suggests that the Minnesota District Court’s 
meticulous consideration of the LIA’s preemptive scope in Beimert provides 
the correct framework for courts addressing the same or similar LIA 
preemption arguments.
153
 The LIA does not reach every part or component 
on a train; specifically, it does not reach brake shoes on freight cars.
154
 A 
detailed consideration of the LIA and its preemptive scope leads to the 
conclusion that brake shoes on freight cars do not fall within the scope of the 
LIA due to logical, legal, and pragmatic considerations.
155
 Consequently, 
under this model, plaintiffs afflicted with asbestos-related diseases and 
without access to FELA claims are not left without legal recourse.
156
 
 
A. The Presumption Against Preemption Calls for a Narrow Interpretation 
of the LIA’s Field Preemption 
 
 At the outset, preemption generally faces the presumption that 
federal laws do not trump state laws absent a clear and manifest intention 
from Congress.
157
 While the Supreme Court declared in Napier that the LIA 
occupies the field of locomotive equipment, the presumption against 
preemption should persuade courts to avoid a haphazard expansion of the 
                                                                                                                   
legislative intent such as the context, history, scope, and objective of the statute, including 
the consequences of alternative interpretations, illuminate the intent of the legislature.”); 
Griffith v. State, 116 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (providing, “if a statute may be 
interpreted reasonably in two different ways, a court may consider the consequences of 
differing interpretations in deciding which interpretation to adopt”); Five Corners Family 
Farmers v. State, 268 P.3d 892, 900 (Wash. 2011) (observing “[i]t is true that we ‘will avoid 
[a] literal reading of a statute which would result in unlikely, absurd, or strained 
consequences.’”).  
153 See supra text accompanying notes 146–152 (illustrating the Minnesota 
District Court’s denial of summary judgment, reasoning the LIA does not preempt claims for 
defective products on railcars, as opposed to locomotives or their appurtenances). 
154 See infra Parts III.A–F (providing arguments that support narrowing the scope 
of the LIA and its preemptive effect).  
155 See infra Parts III.A–F (arguing the LIA’s field preemption is grounded on a 
preemption theory that has significantly changed since its decision and the inclusion of 
defective products into the LIA expands an outmoded theory of preemption). An expansive 
reading of what constitutes locomotive equipment or locomotive parts and appurtenances 
result in unjust consequences because it leaves an innocent class of individuals without a legal 
remedy. Those unjust consequences are incongruent with original intent of the LIA.  
156 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 152 (noting the Minnesota District 
Court’s acknowledgment that preemption results in no remedy for an innocent plaintiff, which 
influenced the court’s ultimate decision to rule against preemption and thereby provide the 
plaintiff with a legal remedy). 
157 See supra text accompanying note 52 (explaining the general bias against 
preemption). 
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field.
158
 Additionally, courts should not presume that all parts or components 
on a train are locomotive equipment.
159
 
 The presumption against preemption is apposite for cases 
interpreting whether brake shoes on railcars fall within the scope of the LIA 
for a number of reasons.
160
 First, the LIA does not clearly and manifestly 
extend to brake shoes on railcars attached to the locomotive.
161
 Second, the 
field preemption doctrine is more constrictive today than in 1936, when the 
Supreme Court declared that the LIA occupies the field of locomotive 
equipment.
162
 Third, states have historically regulated the health and safety 
of their citizens by operation of state laws.
163
  
 Notwithstanding the Court’s declaration that the LIA occupies the 
field of locomotive equipment, it is far from clear that Congress intended the 
LIA to reach brake shoes on railcars—objects that do not touch and are not 
located on locomotives.
164
 First, Congress did not provide an express 
preemption clause in the LIA indicating its intent to preempt state laws.
165
 It 
is an even further stretch to hold that the LIA preempts state laws from 
addressing brake shoes on railcars, especially noting that the LIA explicitly 
mentions “tender” but fails to explicitly include railcars.
166
 Nevertheless, in 
1936, the Court construed the LIA to occupy the field, inferring manifest 
congressional intent based on the Interstate Commerce Commission’s broad 
scope of authority.
167
 Recently, in Kurns, the Court confirmed Napier’s 
declaration of field preemption and held that the LIA preempted state law 
                                                 
158 See supra text accompanying note 67 (describing the Court’s holding in 
Napier); supra text accompanying note 52 (noting the presumption against preemption). 
159 See supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing the Napier decision and its 
holding that the LIA “occupies the field” of locomotives or tender and its parts and 
appurtenances). 
160 See generally supra text accompanying notes 26, 52, 55, 64, 93 (noting that the 
LIA lacks an express preemption clause, the modern and restrictive view of preemption, and 
the state’s historic powers over the health and safety of their citizens). 
161 Compare supra text accompanying note 26 (illustrating that the LIA lacks any 
express preemption clause), with supra note 55 and accompanying text (illustrating that 
ERISA and the MDA explicitly displace state law). 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 90–94 (explaining two Supreme Court 
Justices’ doubt that Napier would be decided the same under the modern view of preemption). 
163 See supra note 52 (explaining that state laws historically provide redress for 
defective products, failure to warn, fraud, and consumer rights violations). 
164 See supra text accompanying note 67 (illustrating the Napier decision and its 
holding that the LIA occupies the field of locomotives or tender and its parts and 
appurtenances). 
165 See supra text accompanying note 26 (showing that the LIA lacks any express 
preemption clause); contra supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting that ERISA and the 
MDA explicitly displace state law). 
166 Supra text accompanying note 26 (providing the complete LIA, which does not 
reference or mention a railcar but explicitly includes “tender”). 
167 See supra text accompanying note 67 (analyzing the Napier decision and the 
Court’s reliance on the Interstate Commerce Commission’s broad scope of authority). 
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tort claims.
168
 However, neither decision found a clear and manifest intent 
that the LIA reaches brake shoes on railcars because neither case addressed 
brake shoes on railcars.
169
 More broadly, neither Napier nor Kurns 
addressed train components or parts not located on the locomotive or coming 
into contact with the locomotive.
170
  
 Second, the modern field preemption doctrine is considerably more 
restrictive than it was at the time the Supreme Court declared that the LIA 
“occup[ied] the entire field regulating locomotive equipment.”
171
 Justice 
Kagan and Sotomayor recognized the shift in the doctrine in their respective 
opinions in Kurns.
172
 The inclusion of railcar brake shoes into the scope of 
the LIA only perpetuates or expands the outdated doctrine of preemption, 
referred to by Supreme Court Justice Kagan as an anachronism.
173
 Thus, a 
restrictive reading of the LIA’s scope can cauterize the LIA and stop 
furtherance of an outmoded version of field preemption.
174
  
 Third, states have historically invoked their police powers to regulate 
the health and safety of their citizens by operation of state laws.
175
 Despite 
that notion, the LIA supersedes historic police powers due to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Napier and Kurns.
176
 Thus, a court deciding whether a 
train part or component is within the scope of the LIA should keep in mind 
that inclusion will permit the preemption of a historic police power, which is 
generally disfavored.
177
 
 While Napier and Kurns overcame the presumption against 
preemption and held that the LIA preempts state law directed at the 
                                                 
168 See supra text accompanying note 86 (analyzing the Kurns decision and the 
Court’s reliance on Napier). 
169 See supra text accompanying note 68 (illustrating the facts of Napier, which 
contain no reference to railcars); supra text accompanying note 80 (illustrating the facts of 
Kurns, which contain no reference to railcars). 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 68, 80. 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 90–94 (explaining two Supreme Court 
Justices’ doubt that Napier would be decided the same under the modern view of preemption); 
see also supra note 91 (quoting Justice Kagan that, “[v]iewed through the lens of modern 
preemption law, Napier is an anachronism”). 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 90–94. 
173 See supra text accompanying note 98 (noting that the interpretation of the LIA 
either expands or contracts the scope and effect of the LIA). 
174 See supra text accompanying note 98 (providing that a court’s analysis of the 
LIA determines the scope and effect of the statute).  
175 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that state laws 
historically provide redress for defective products, failure to warn, fraud, and consumer rights 
violations). 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (illustrating the Napier holding that 
state laws enacted for the health and safety of its citizens were preempted by the LIA); supra 
text accompanying note 79 (analyzing the Kurns holding that state law claims for design 
defect and failure to warn, which protect the health and safety of its citizens, were preempted 
by the LIA). 
177 See supra text accompanying note 52 (noting that preemption inquiries are 
guided by a general presumption that state historic police powers were not intended to be 
displaced absent an explicit purpose of Congress to do so). 
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equipment of locomotives, the presumption against preemption should guide 
courts deciding whether train parts or components are the equipment of 
locomotives.
178
 Based on the foregoing, the presumption against preemption 
is well suited for cases deciding whether brake shoes on railcars fall within 
the scope of the LIA.
179
 Therefore, the presumption against preemption 
promotes a narrow interpretation of the LIA.
180
 
 
B. Brake Shoes on Railcars Do Not Fall Within the Court’s Interpretation 
of Locomotive “Parts and Appurtenances” 
 
 Brake shoes on railcars do not fall within the court’s interpretation of 
locomotive equipment or “locomotive or tender and its parts and 
appurtenances.”
181
 In Lunsford, the Court correctly excluded anything that is 
not integral or essential to a completed locomotive from what constitutes 
locomotive parts and appurtenances.
182
 Although brake shoes on railcars are 
not experimental emergency brake devices as in Lunsford, the similarities are 
apparent.
183
 Both products involve stopping the entire train, as opposed to 
only the locomotive.
184
 The brake shoes on railcars are not essential to the 
operation of the locomotive because they are located on railcars and not the 
                                                 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (analyzing the Napier holding); 
supra text accompanying note 79 (illustrating the Kurns holding that state law tort claims 
were preempted by the LIA). 
179 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 149 (illustrating the Minnesota District 
Court decision that took into account the presumption against preemption in its consideration 
of whether the LIA preempted claims against the manufacturers of asbestos-laden brake shoes 
attached to railcars). 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 (explaining that the presumption 
against preemption promotes a narrow interpretation of the federal statute in question). 
181 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 146–152 (noting that the Minnesota 
District Court decision provides a detailed consideration of why brake shoes on locomotive 
are not within the scope of the LIA). 
182 See supra text accompanying note 104 (illustrating the main takeaway of 
Lunsford—that locomotive appurtenances are “[w]hatever in fact is an integral or essential 
part of a completed locomotive”). The Court held that an experimental device fastened 
beneath the locomotive was not a locomotive part or appurtenance. See supra text 
accompanying note 99 (providing the facts of Lunsford). 
183 See supra note 151 (explaining the Minnesota District Court’s rationale, which 
is partly based on a Massachusetts Superior Court case that found brake systems were 
independent of the locomotive, therefore the brake shoes were appurtenant to the brake 
system, not the locomotive). Note that the locomotive is not the entire train, but rather only the 
front engine of the train. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing the definition of 
locomotive near the time the LIA was amended to include the locomotive). 
184 See supra note 151 (noting that the Minnesota District Court’s finding that the 
brake system operated independently from the locomotive and operated to stop the entire 
train).  
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locomotive; rather, the brake system and its brake shoes are independent of 
the train, as the court noted in its Beimert analysis.
185
 
 Further, the location of asbestos-containing products, such as brake 
shoes on railcars and not the locomotive, supports the conclusion that brake 
shoes on railcars are not a locomotive part or appurtenance within the 
meaning of the LIA.
186
 Brake shoes on railcars are distinguishable from the 
device that the district court held fell within the scope of the LIA in 
Burlington N. R.R. Co.
187
 The court relied primarily on the location of one 
part of the two-way telemetry system, which was in the locomotive cab.
188
 
Similarly, in Lunsford, the brake device was fastened beneath the locomotive 
and in proximity to the locomotive, but the Court found that it was not within 
the meaning of the LIA.
189
 Given the concentration on the location of the 
asbestos-containing product, brake shoes on railcars that do not touch 
locomotives and can be located hundreds of yards away from the locomotive 
should not be considered a locomotive part or appurtenance.
190
 
 The district court’s decision in Milesco is inapposite for a court 
considering brake shoes on railcars but is nevertheless meaningful because of 
the court’s discussion in its dicta.
191
 When the court held that the cushion 
unit removed from the railcar was at one time a part or appurtenance of the 
locomotive, the court failed to recognize the subtle distinction between the 
hypothetical cushion unit it spoke of and the locomotive brake pads and 
engine valves in Kurns.
192
 Namely, the court equated parts on railcars with 
parts on locomotives.
193
 Under Milesco’s dicta, the LIA would preempt state 
                                                 
185 See supra note 151 (noting the Minnesota District Court’s finding that the 
brake system was similar to the brake system in the Massachusetts Superior Court Case, 
which held that the brake system was independent of the locomotive). 
186 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 152 (illustrating the Minnesota District 
Court’s finding that the brake shoes on railcars are factually distinguishable from Kurns based 
on location). 
187 See supra text accompanying note 109 (analyzing the district court decision 
that relied on the fact that the device was in part located on the locomotive, as opposed to 
railcar brake shoes which operate independent of the locomotive).  
188 See supra text accompanying note 109 (noting the district court decision that 
relied on the location of the device on the locomotive, distinguishable from railcar brake 
shoes); supra note 151 (explaining the Minnesota District Court’s finding that the brake shoes 
were appurtenant to the brake system). 
189 See supra text accompanying note 100 (illustrating that the braking device in 
Lunsford was fastened on or near the locomotive). 
190 See supra text accompanying note 151 (explaining the Minnesota District 
Court’s rationale). 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 114–115 (analyzing the Milesco opinion, 
which stated that a decommissioned cushion unit attached to a railcar was at one time a 
locomotive appurtenance). 
192 See supra note 115 (illustrating the court’s reliance on Kurns despite the 
factual difference between the locomotive brake shoes and locomotive engine valves in Kurns 
and the railcar cushion unit in Milesco).  
193 See supra note 115 (analyzing the court’s dicta in Milesco that seemingly 
jumped to the conclusion that the cushion unit attached to the railcar was at one time a 
locomotive part or appurtenance). 
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law claims directed at any devices, parts, or components on any railcar in 
addition to the devices, parts, or components on the locomotive.
194
 
 Finally, in Grogg, a district court correctly recognized limitations on 
the LIA’s preemptive effect on state laws.
195
 Brake shoes on railcars should 
fall outside the preemptive effect of the LIA based on the court’s language 
that “not anything and everything that could possibly touch the train or 
anything and everything involving train safety” is preempted by the LIA.
196
 
Grogg serves to remind a reviewing court that, while brake shoes involve 
train safety, they are not per se within the LIA’s scope.
197
 
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Recent Decision Does Not Apply to Cases 
Deciding Whether Train or Railcar Parts or Components Are Within the 
LIA 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Kurns does not bind courts 
considering whether the LIA preempts claims directed at manufacturers of 
brake shoes on railcars.
198
 A cursory review of the facts in Kurns may lead to 
an inferential, yet illogical leap to preemption—that state law tort claims 
against manufacturers of railcar brake shoes are preempted because Kurns 
held that state tort law claims against manufacturers of locomotive brake 
shoes are preempted.
199
 However, as the preceding sentence illustrates, 
Kurns is distinguishable for a court considering whether brake shoes on 
railcars fall within the preemptive scope of the LIA.
200
 
 Foremost, the Court held that brake shoes on locomotives and 
insulation on locomotive boilers fell within the scope of the LIA and 
therefore the state law tort claims were preempted because the defective parts 
were locomotive equipment.
201
 The plaintiff, Corson, did not dispute that the 
asbestos-containing products were attached to the locomotive.
202
 Therefore, 
                                                 
194 See supra note 115 (noting the difference between the locomotive parts or 
appurtenances and railcar parts or appurtenances).  
195 See supra text accompanying notes 121–122 (noting the court’s recognition 
that the LIA does not reach the entire train)  
196 See supra text accompanying notes 121–122. 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 121–122 (concluding that brake shoes on 
railcars are not per se within the statute). 
198 See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining the Minnesota District 
Court’s finding that Kurns is not binding to a court considering whether brake shoes on 
railcars fall within the scope of the LIA). 
199 Compare supra text accompanying notes 143–144 (analyzing Cunitz-Robinson, 
which failed to distinguish between locomotive brake shoes and railcar brake shoes), with 
supra text accompanying notes 148–152 (illustrating the Minnesota District Court case, which 
distinguished between locomotive brake shoes and railcar brake shoes). 
200 Compare supra text accompanying note 80 (providing the facts of Kurns in 
which the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos derived from locomotive brake shoes and 
locomotive engine valve insulation), with supra note 147 (noting that the asbestos exposure 
derived from railcar brake shoes). 
201 See supra text accompanying note 80 (providing the Court’s holding in Kurns). 
202 See supra text accompanying note 84 (outlining the plaintiff’s arguments).  
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the Court did not discuss the boundaries of what constitutes locomotive 
equipment or locomotive parts and appurtenances.
203
 Thus, Kurns is 
inapplicable to a claim against the manufacturer of brake shoes on railcars 
unless the reviewing court first decides the brake shoe on the railcar is 
locomotive equipment or a locomotive part or appurtenance on other 
grounds.
204
 
 
D. Courts Must Distinguish Between Train or Railcar Parts or 
Components and Locomotive “Parts and Appurtenances” 
 
 Certain courts have been called upon to determine whether train or 
railcar parts or components are locomotive parts and appurtenances and 
therefore within the scope of the LIA.
205
 A number of courts have equated 
railcars with locomotives or brakes on railcars with brakes on locomotives.
206
 
Reliance on these cases is inappropriate.
207
 An illustration of these cases 
illuminates these courts’ errors and also the distinction between railcar parts 
or components and locomotive parts or appurtenances that courts must make.  
 The California Appellate Court’s reasoning in Ransford is flawed 
because it relied on cases that addressed different and inapplicable factual 
scenarios.
208
 In effect, the court read railcar parts or appurtenances, as 
opposed to locomotive parts or appurtenances, into the LIA.
209
 The inclusion 
of the entire train and train parts or appurtenances has the effect of expanding 
the scope of the LIA based on a misrepresentation of the LIA.
210
 The court 
relied on cases where the plaintiffs’ alleged state law tort claims were against 
locomotive manufacturers, which ultimately led to preemption under the 
LIA.
211
 In Ransford, the court incorrectly focused on whether brake shoes 
were an appurtenance to the railcar, and not whether the brake shoes on a 
                                                 
203 See supra text accompanying note 87 (explaining that the Supreme Court did 
not discuss locomotive parts or appurtenances in Kurns). 
204 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 151 (illustrating that claims against 
manufacturers of brake shoes attached to railcars presents a distinguishable factual scenario 
from Kurns).  
205 See supra Part II.F (illustrating several cases considering whether brake shoes 
railcars are within the LIA’s regulatory boundaries). 
206 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 131, 135–136, 137–139, 144 
(illustrating several cases in which reviewing courts found no distinction between locomotive 
parts and railcar parts). 
207 See, e.g., supra note 151 (explaining that the Minnesota District Court found 
Ransford and Cunitz-Robinson inapposite). 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 128–136 (providing a case illustration of 
Ransford). 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 135–136 (explaining that the Ransford 
court held that brake shoes were appurtenant to the railcar, not to the locomotive). 
210 See supra text accompanying note 98 (explaining that the interpretation of the 
LIA can expand the scope and effect of the LIA). 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 132–134 (discussing the facts of the 
California Appellate and Supreme Court cases in which Ransford relied on in its opinion). 
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railcar are an appurtenance to the locomotive.
212
 The court’s misstep reflects 
a misapprehension of the LIA’s language.
213
  
 Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court incorrectly held that 
state law tort claims against “manufacturers of various products used by the 
railroads” were preempted by the LIA without inquiring into whether the 
various products were locomotive parts or appurtenances.
214
 The court’s 
reasoning was based in large part on Law v. Gen. Motors Corp. and its 
progeny.
215
 However, the court broadly characterized the facts of Law, which 
resulted in a crucial mischaracterization: “In the more modern case of Law, 
the Ninth Circuit considered the claims made by railroad workers against the 
manufacturers of train parts and components.”
216
 In fact, Law considered 
whether locomotive brakes and engines were within the scope of the LIA.
217
 
Moreover, the court’s so-called “avalanche of adverse authority” consisted 
primarily of cases holding that the LIA preempts state law claims against 
manufacturers of locomotive parts or appurtenances.
218
 Thus, the court 
preempted thousands of state law tort claims due to its mischaracterization of 
precedent, regardless of whether the claims were directed at the equipment of 
locomotives or at train or railcar equipment in general.
219
 This decision, like 
Ransford, mistakenly expanded the scope and effect of the LIA to read 
railcar parts or appurtenances, as opposed to locomotive parts or 
appurtenances.
220
  
 In Cunitz-Robinson, the court relied on Kurns to reject the plaintiff’s 
argument that the defective brake shoes on tank cars were not locomotives or 
locomotive parts and appurtenances.
221
 The court declared that the claims 
were directed at the equipment of locomotives, thereby holding that brake 
shoes on railcars are a part or appurtenance to the locomotive.
222
 The court 
provided little reasoning for its decision, making conclusory statements 
                                                 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 135–136 (illustrating that the court held 
that brakes shoes on rolling stock were clearly an appurtenance to railcars). 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 135–136 (explaining that the Ransford 
court held that brake shoes were appurtenant to the railcar, not to the locomotive). 
214 See supra text accompanying note 75 (providing the West Virginia Supreme 
Court’s holding in In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig.). 
215 See supra text accompanying note 138 (explaining Law, the Ninth Circuit case 
that the West Virginia Supreme Court found persuasive). 
216 See supra text accompanying note 139 (stating the plaintiff’s claims). 
217 See supra text accompanying note 139 (providing the facts from the Ninth 
Circuit case that the West Virginia Supreme Court found distinguishable).  
218 See supra note 138 (quoting the cases that the West Virginia Supreme Court 
found persuasive due to their reliance on Law). 
219 See supra text accompanying note 75 (providing the West Virginia Supreme 
Court’s holding). 
220 See supra text accompanying note 98 (explaining that the interpretation of the 
LIA can expand the scope and effect of the LIA).  
221 See supra text accompanying note 144 (explaining the plaintiff’s argument that 
Kurns did not apply because the brake shoes were located on the railcar). 
222 See supra text accompanying note 144–145 (providing the court’s holding 
based on Kurns). 
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without conducting a meaningful interpretation.
223
 Without an interpretative 
analysis, the court made a common error, as illustrated in Ransford and In re 
W. Va. Asbestos Litig.; the court made an inferential leap, declaring that the 
appendages to railcars are necessarily the equipment of locomotives.
224
 
 
E. The Intent or Objective of the LIA Is Not to Preclude Plaintiffs from 
State Law Claims Related to Asbestos Exposure from Brake Shoes on 
Railcars 
 
 The LIA’s intent is far removed from precluding state law tort claims 
brought against manufacturers of defective products placed on railcars.
225
 
The common law provides adequate protection for citizens and their 
safety.
226
 Therefore, the historic need for the LIA to protect railroad 
employees from dangerous working conditions is no longer necessary.
227
 In 
fact, the adequacy and powerful effect of state laws is brought to light by the 
abundance of plaintiffs that prefer state laws as a means of recourse for their 
injuries.
228
 Thus, the LIA is no longer the exclusive means of adequate 
protection for railroad employees because state laws effectively provide 
redress.
229
 
 Moreover, the LIA sought to prevent an entirely different evil than 
exposure to asbestos-laden brake shoes on railcars that cause debilitating 
                                                 
223 See supra text accompanying note 143 (stating that the brake shoes on tank 
cars “cannot reasonably be considered anything but locomotive equipment, or in other words, 
locomotives and parts and appurtenances”). 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 135–136 (explaining that the Ransford 
court held that brake shoes were appurtenant to the railcar, not to the locomotive); supra text 
accompanying notes 138–139 (noting that the court relied on broadly stated facts in Law, not 
necessarily accurate, and thereby included train parts and components into the LIA); supra 
text accompanying note 143 (stating that the brake shoes on tank cars “cannot reasonably be 
considered anything but locomotive equipment, or in other words, locomotives and parts and 
appurtenances). 
225 See generally supra Part II.A (noting that the LIA arose during a progressive 
movement over a century ago when a railroad union successfully lobbied to protect railroad 
employees from dangerous working condition because state laws were ineffective). 
226 See supra note 52 (explaining that state laws historically provide redress for 
defective products, failure to warn, fraud, and consumer rights violations). 
227 See supra note 52. 
228 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 73 (thousands of current and former 
railroad employees alleging state law tort claims against manufacturers); supra text 
accompanying note 82 (railroad employee alleging state law tort claims); supra text 
accompanying notes 113, 116 (plaintiff alleging state law tort claims against the manufacturer 
of a cushion unit that caused injuries to the plaintiff); supra text accompanying note 130 
(plaintiff alleging state law tort claims against manufacturer of asbestos-laden brake shoes); 
supra text accompanying note 142 (plaintiff alleged state law torts claims for long-term 
exposure to asbestos-laden brake shoes); supra text accompanying note 147 (plaintiff alleging 
state law tort claims for relief due to exposure to asbestos-laden brake shoes). 
229 See supra note 52. 
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diseases.
230
 Congress originally enacted the BIA to protect rail workers from 
immediate injuries such as those from large explosions, as opposed to toxins 
from a product not even in widespread use at the time of the enactment.
231
 
Although the amendment expanded the BIA beyond the boiler, the language 
still constrained itself to the “locomotive or tender and its parts and 
appurtenances.”
232
 In fact, it appears the impetus for the amendment came 
from an ongoing practice of non-compulsory reports of additional defects on 
the locomotive itself, not from reports of defects down the line of the train.
233
 
As such, the LIA was intended to allow safe operation of locomotives.
234
  
 A juxtaposition of the LIA’s intent with the effect demonstrates the 
point: 
 
Intent: Railroad employee union lobbies for legislation to 
ensure safe operation of locomotives because state laws were 
ineffective, resulting in injuries due to boiler explosions. The 
original enactment was amended to include the “locomotive 
or tender and its parts and appurtenances” because it was 
common to report additional defects on the locomotive.
235
  
 
Effect: One hundred years later, state law tort claims against 
manufacturers of asbestos-laden products on railcars are 
barred by the statute.
236
  
 
As such, preclusion of state law tort claims against manufacturers of 
asbestos-laden products attached to railcars does not embody the intent or 
objective of the LIA.
237
 
 
                                                 
230 See supra text accompanying note 22 (noting that the BIA sought to prevent 
immediate dangers on locomotive boilers, specifically boiler explosions caused by low water 
levels). 
231 See supra text accompanying note 22 (explaining the original intent of the 
BIA). 
232 See supra text accompanying note 24 (noting the language added to the BIA). 
233 See supra text accompanying note 23 (noting that the amendment to the BIA 
was an adoption of a current practice of reporting defects on the locomotive beyond the boiler 
itself, such as leaky steam valves on the locomotive). 
234 See supra note 150 (discussing a Minnesota District Court case that declared 
the objective of the LIA “was to allow safe operation of locomotives”). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 19–24 (noting that the LIA arose during a 
progressive movement over a century ago when a railroad union successfully lobbied to 
protect railroad employees from dangerous working condition because state laws were 
ineffective).  
236 See supra text accompanying note 22 (explaining that, in some instances, 
preemption bars state law tort claims altogether, which is far removed from the LIA’s 
humanitarian purpose). 
237 See supra note 150. 
28
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss2/9
2014] FOR EVERY WRONG, A REMEDY 377 
 
 
F. Preemption Results in Unjust Consequences 
 
 Declaring that asbestos-laden brake shoes fall within the preempted 
field of the LIA results in unjust consequences for nonemployees suffering 
from asbestos-related diseases.
238
 The preemptive effect of the LIA leaves 
nonemployees without any legal recourse.
239
  
 Courts must narrowly interpret the scope of LIA’s preemption to 
ensure that certain innocent plaintiffs such as the plaintiff in Beimert are 
afforded a legal remedy.
240
 Courts should reject the Ransford and Cunitz-
Robinson analyses because they fail to consider the consequences of 
alternate interpretations of the statute and may preclude innocent plaintiffs 
from any remedy.
241
 The Supreme Court of West Virginia acknowledged that 
“for every wrong there is supposed to be a remedy somewhere.”
242
 To 
provide a remedy, courts must draw a line where locomotive parts or 
appurtenances end and train parts or components begin, as opposed to 
haphazardly concluding that all train parts or components on a railcar are 
within the scope of the LIA.
243
  
 The grounds for a restricted interpretation based on alternative 
consequences of interpretation can be illustrated in two hypothetical 
scenarios in which a nonemployee is afflicted with an asbestos-related 
disease:  
 
Plaintiff A is a nonemployee afflicted with mesothelioma 
contracted from long-term exposure to asbestos while 
washing the clothes of his or her spouse over a twenty-year 
period. The spouse whose clothes are laundered by the other 
was routinely exposed to asbestos while changing brake 
shoes on locomotives.  
 
                                                 
238 See supra text accompanying note 33 (explaining that nonemployees whose 
state law tort claims are preempted are without a remedy). 
239 See supra text accompanying note 32 (explaining that nonemployees cannot 
pursue FELA claims). 
240 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 152 (providing an alternative 
interpretation would leave a nonemployee afflicted with mesothelioma without a legal 
remedy). 
241 See supra note 152 and accompanying text(citing multiple states that consider 
the consequences of alternative interpretations of statutes and illustrating Beimert, in which 
the court held that the brake shoes on railcars did not fall within the scope of the LIA, partly 
because it would leave a nonemployee without legal recourse against a manufacturer that 
allegedly caused her mesothelioma).  
242 See supra text accompanying note 78 (noting that the West Virginia Supreme 
Court’s reasoning with regard to innocent plaintiffs left without a remedy). 
243 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 146, 152 (discussing Beimert, in 
which the court distinguished brake shoes attached to locomotives from brake shoes attached 
to railcars so as to prevent the LIA from moving beyond its original intent). 
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Plaintiff B is a nonemployee afflicted with mesothelioma 
contracted from long-term exposure to asbestos while 
washing the clothes of his or her spouse over a twenty-year 
period. The spouse whose clothes are laundered by the other 
was routinely exposed to asbestos while changing brake 
shoes on railcars.
244
 
 
In both scenarios, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kurns is binding.
245
 Thus, 
Plaintiff A’s state law tort claims are precluded because the facts are 
indistinguishable from Kurns—brake shoes on locomotives are the 
equipment of locomotives, and the claim is directed against the equipment.
246
 
Further, neither plaintiff has a FELA remedy because both are 
nonemployees.
247
 However, because the brake shoes are located on the 
railcar, a court may provide innocent Plaintiff B a legal remedy under a 
restrictive interpretation of the LIA.
248
 Under In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., 
Ransford, and Cunitz-Robinson, Plaintiff B is subject to the same fate as 
Plaintiff A because those cases made no distinction between brake shoes or 
train parts and components on railcars and brake shoes or train parts and 
components on locomotives.
249
 Under Beimert,
250
 Plaintiff B’s claims are not 
precluded by the LIA, and the innocent party may bring forth state law 
claims.
251
 Based on the foregoing, courts should consider the effect of a 
broad interpretation of the LIA, which in certain circumstances leaves 
innocent plaintiffs without a remedy.
252
 Thus, the alternative interpretation—
brake shoes on railcars do not constitute a locomotive part or appurtenance—
is best. 
 
                                                 
244 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 147 (noting the plaintiff, a 
nonemployee, and her claim against the manufacturer of railcar brake shoes). 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 88–89 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
held that state law tort claims directed at the equipment of locomotives are preempted by the 
LIA). 
246 See supra text accompanying note 82 (illustrating that the plaintiff in Kurns 
brought claims for defective locomotive products).  
247 See supra text accompanying note 32 (explaining that nonemployees must use 
state courts because nonemployees cannot pursue FELA claims). 
248 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 146–152 (illustrating Beimert in 
which the court distinguished between brake shoes attached to locomotives from brake shoes 
attached to railcars and held that the LIA did not preempt the state law tort claim). 
249 Compare supra Part II.F (providing cases that equated railcar brake shoes with 
locomotive brake shoes), with supra text accompanying notes 146–152 (distinguishing 
between brake shoes attached to locomotives and brake shoes attached to railcars). 
250 See supra note 152 (explaining the reasoning in a Massachusetts District Court 
of Middlesex County that made a distinction between railcars and locomotives, holding that a 
brake system is independent of a locomotive).  
251 See supra text accompanying notes 146–152 (holding that the LIA did not 
preempt the state law tort claim). 
252 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (illustrating that, in Beimert, the 
broad alternative interpretation of the LIA precludes innocent plaintiffs from a remedy).  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 In 1936, the Supreme Court declared that the LIA occupies the field 
of locomotive equipment and preempts state law.
253
 Today, the century-old 
LIA remains in full effect, precluding state law tort claims.
254
 As reviewing 
courts ultimately determine how far the LIA casts its net, courts should limit 
the effect of the LIA for a number of reasons.
255
 
 First, the LIA’s field preemption is grounded on a preemption theory 
that has significantly changed since its decision, and the inclusion of 
defective products into the LIA expands an outmoded theory of 
preemption.
256
 Rather, a restrictive interpretation of what constitutes 
locomotive equipment or locomotive parts and appurtenances will limit a 
probable unforeseen consequence of the LIA.
257
 Moreover, an expansive 
reading of what constitutes locomotive equipment or locomotive parts and 
appurtenances results in unjust consequences because it leaves a class of 
innocent individuals without a legal remedy.
258
 Those unjust consequences 
are incongruent with the original intent of the LIA.
259
 Finally, an analysis of 
on-point case law reveals that a number of courts have failed to make a 
logical distinction between parts attached to locomotives and parts attached 
to railcars, which results in an overly broad and incorrect reading of the 
                                                 
253 See supra text accompanying note 67 (holding that the LIA occupies the field 
and extends to the “design, construction and the material of every part of the locomotive and 
tender and of all appurtenances”). 
254 See supra text accompanying note 89 (holding that the LIA preempts state law 
tort claims). 
255 See supra text accompanying note 98 (explaining that courts determine 
whether the LIA preempts state laws based on whether the defective product is a locomotive 
part or appurtenance and thereby expands or contracts the scope of the LIA); supra Parts 
III.A–F (arguing that the LIA’s field preemption is grounded on a preemption theory that has 
significantly changed since its decision and the inclusion of defective products into the LIA 
expands an outmoded theory of preemption). An expansive reading of what constitutes 
locomotive equipment or locomotive parts and appurtenances results in unjust consequences 
because it leaves an innocent class of individuals without a legal remedy. Those unjust 
consequences are inconsistent with original intent of the LIA. 
256 See supra text accompanying notes 172–174 (arguing that the modern field 
preemption doctrine should persuade a court to narrowly interpret the LIA, which is based on 
the outmoded version of field preemption). 
257 See supra text accompanying note 174 (contending that a restrictive reading of 
the LIA’s scope can limit the LIA to its intended scope and stop furtherance of an outmoded 
version of field preemption). 
258 See supra Part III.F (arguing that declaring asbestos-laden brake shoes fall 
within the preempted field of the LIA results in unjust consequences for nonemployees 
suffering from asbestos-related diseases). 
259 See supra Part III.E (arguing that state laws now effectively address railroad 
employees’ concerns, whereas state laws was ineffective at the time the BIA was enacted, and 
that the evil sought to be remedied by the LIA was immediate injury due to locomotive boiler 
explosions). 
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LIA.
260
 Based on the foregoing, reviewing courts should cauterize the reach 
of the LIA and find that brake shoes on railcars are not a locomotive part or 
appurtenance. 
                                                 
260 See supra Part III.D (asserting that reliance on cases equating locomotive brake 
shoes with railcar brake shoes is incorrect and inappropriate). 
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